Author

Utku K Ercan

Algorand Inc; Stony Brook University; IAS; MIT; Tsinghua University - Cited by 1,424 - Game theory and mechanism design - distributed ledgers - theory of computation

Biography

Utku K Ercan is working as an Assistant Professor at Surgical Infection Research Program, Drexel University College of Medicine, USA. He is having experience of more than 10years and he had attended many International Conferences and chair the sessions.
Title
Cited by
Year
Algorand: A secure and efficient distributed ledger
J Chen, S MicaliTheoretical Computer Science 777, 155-183, 2019561201
561
2019
Malicious KGC Attack in Certificateless Cryptography
MH Au, J Chen, JK Liu, Y Mu, D Wong, G YangACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS …, 2007200
285
2007
Algorand agreement: Super fast and partition resilient byzantine agreement
J Chen, S Gorbunov, S Micali, G VlachosCryptology ePrint Archive, 2018201
75
2018
The Order Independence of Iterated Dominance in Extensive Games
J Chen, S MicaliTheoretical Economics (TE) 8, 125-163, 201348201
48
2013
Collusive Dominant-Strategy Truthfulness
J Chen, S MicaliJournal of Economic Theory (JET) 147 (3), 1300-1312, 2012201
35
2012
Mechanism Design with Possibilistic Beliefs
J Chen, S MicaliJournal of Economic Theory (JET) 156, 77-102, 201527201
27
2015
Crowdsourced Bayesian Auctions
P Azar, J Chen, S MicaliInnovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS), 2012201
27
2012
Distributed transaction propagation and verification system
S Micali, J ChenUS Patent App. 16/096,107, 2019201
27
2019
Rational proofs with multiple provers
J Chen, S McCauley, S SinghProceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Innovations in Theoretical …, 2016201
26
2016
24
2010
Maximin-aware allocations of indivisible goods
H Chan, J Chen, B Li, X WuarXiv preprint arXiv:1905.09969, 2019201
22
2019
Towards a verified model of the Algorand consensus protocol in Coq
MA Alturki, J Chen, V Luchangco, B Moore, K Palmskog, L Peña, G RoşuFormal Methods. FM 2019 International Workshops: Porto, Portugal, October 7 …, 2020202
22
2020
Tight Revenue Bounds with Possibilistic Beliefs and Level-k Rationality
J Chen, S Micali, R PassEconometrica, 2015201
19
2015
A New Approach to Auctions and Resilient Mechanism Design
J Chen, S MicaliSymposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), 503-512, 200918200
18
2009
Optimal Provision-After-Wait in Healthcare
M Braverman, J Chen, S KannanMathematics of Operations Research (MOR), 2015201
18
2015
Robust Perfect Revenue from Perfectly Informed Players
J Chen, A Hassidim, S MicaliInnovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS), 94-105, 2010201
17
2010
Robustly Leveraging Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions
J Chen, S Micali, P ValiantInnovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS), 81-93, 2010201
16
2010
Truthful Multi-unit Procurements with Budgets
H Chan, J Chen10th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014201
15
2014
A New Framework to the Design and Analysis of Identity-Based Identification Schemes
G Yang, J Chen, D Wong, X Deng, D WangTheoretical Computer Science (TCS) 407 (1-3), 370-388, 2008200
15
2008
Provision-after-wait with common preferences
H Chan, J Chen, G SrinivasanACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) 5 (2), 1-36, 2017201
8
2017